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Notes	on	compromise:	joining	the	EEA	is	not	the
same	as	staying	in	the	EU
On	behalf	of	Scotland,	Nicola	Sturgeon	has	urged	that	the	UK	leave	the	EU	but	remain	within	the
Customs	Union.	It	should	seek	also	to	join	the	European	Economic	Area	on	the	same	terms	as	Norway
and	Iceland	enjoy.	Many	others	have	defended	the	same	proposal.	On	a	free	vote,	it	would	probably
command	a	majority	in	the	House	of	Commons.	And	why	should	not	the	EU	accept	it?	David
Wiggins	(Oxford)	discusses	the	EEA	option	and	concludes	it	is	the	necessary	compromise	in	the
aftermath	of	the	2016	referendum.	
Brexiters	see	the	so-called	EEA	option	as	spurning	or	obstructing	or	negating	the	will	of	the	people,	rather	than	as
offering	a	way	of	implementing	that	will.	But	here,	on	the	levels	of	policy,	of	fact	and	of	democracy	itself,	the	Brexiters
are	simply	mistaken.	By	origin	and	by	definition	the	EEA	is	not	the	EU,	and	the	case	for	our	staying	in
the	Customs	Union	derives	from	an	inescapable	commitment	which	does	not	derive	from	the	EU.
First	then	the	EEA.	In	his	Concise	Encyclopedia	of	the	European	Union	(2004),	the	late	lamented	Rodney	Leach,	a
singularly	well-informed	Eurosceptic,	a	friend	and	counsellor	to	numerous	Brexiters,	writes	that	–
“Membership	of	the	EEA	does	not	commit	the	signatories	to	the	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy,	to
co-operation	in	Justice	and	Home	Affairs,	to	EMU,	to	the	Common	Agriculture	Policy	or	to	the	Common
Fisheries	Policy.	Moreover,	the	institutions	of	the	EEA,	including	the	EFTA	Court	are	expressly	stated	to
lack	the	authority	claimed	by	the	institutions	of	the	EU.	Thus	most	of	the	areas	which	define	national
independence	remain	within	the	competence	of	the	three	remaining	EEA	states	that	have	elected	not	to
join	the	EU	(Iceland,	Liechtenstein	and	Norway).	At	the	same	time,	these	countries	escape	the	most
intrusive	and	costly	of	the	EU’s	policies	—	altogether	perhaps	a	less	bad	bargain	than	the	EU	would	care
to	admit	for	surrendering	a	say	in	the	framing	of	Single	Market	legislation.”
The	EEA	then	is	not	the	EU,	nor	yet	is	it	a	creature	of	the	EU.	It	is	what	remains	of	EFTA,	the	European	Free	Trade
Association,	a	British-inspired	rejoinder	or	counterstroke	(1960)	to	the	Treaty	of	Rome	(1957).	EFTA	signalled	our
anxiety	whether	the	remnants	of	Imperial	Preference	could	suffice	for	a	trading	nation	such	as	the	UK.	That	anxiety
has	been	at	once	justified	and	alleviated	by	the	volume	of	trade	we	now	have	with	Europe.	It	amounts	to	49%.	EFTA
signalled	also	that	countries	staying	outside	the	EU	would	be	well	advised	to	defend	their	own	interests	(not	least
perhaps	those	relating	to	fisheries).
Joining	the	EEA	is	not	the	same	as	staying	in	the	EU.	In	our	circumstances,	it	is	the	best	way	of	leaving	the	EU.	But
what	is	the	case	for	staying	within	the	EU	Customs	Union?	Above	all,	the	impossibility	of	a	north-south	border	in
Ireland.	Under	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	(1998),	the	British	government	solemnly	undertook,	among	many	other
things,	to	remove	all	security	installations	between	the	Six	Counties	and	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	No	referendum	can
instruct	or	authorise	the	British	government	to	withdraw	from	this	undertaking	—	even	though	continued	membership
of	the	Customs	Union	prevents	us	from	making	new	trade	agreements	otherwise	than	collectively	with	other
members.	This	is	a	damaging	restriction,	it	will	be	said.	Can	we	not	withdraw	from	the	Good	Friday	Agreement?	We
cannot.	Just	as	Brexit	is	Brexit,	so	agreements	are	agreements.	Treaties	are	treaties.	Pacta	sunt	servanda.	That
should	really	be	enough.	But	let	it	be	added	that	what	is	at	stake	here	is	nothing	less	than	peace	in	Ireland.
Brexiters	have	been	apt	to	think	that	the	Irish	border	question	can	be	solved	by	some	sort	of	automation	of	crossing
points	(all	two	hundred	of	them?)	or	other	sophistications.	But	any	such	idea	rests	on	a	failure	to	understand	what
was	so	slowly	and	painfully	achieved	in	1998.	It	threatens	Sinn	Fein	with	the	undoing	of	what	Gerry	Adams	was	able
to	assure	his	supporters	was	the	completion	of	one	whole	phase	in	their	struggle.	Under	the	Good	Friday	Agreement
of	that	year,	citizens	of	Ulster	can	assume	Irish	or	British	nationality	or	both.	If	ever	the	Six	Counties	vote	to	join	the
Republic,	they	will	be	free	to	do	so.	Meanwhile,	the	citizens	of	either	country	can	come	and	go	as	they	please,
without	let	or	hindrance,	by	land,	by	sea,	by	country	lane	or	footpath.	Now,	at	last,	Sinn	Fein	can	see	Ireland	as	one
country.	If	ever	that	idea	is	taken	away	from	them,	it	will	be	unwise	to	be	sure	that	Gerry	Adams	or	anyone	else	will
be	able	to	console	them.	If	Brexiters	grieve	for	the	loss	of	the	chance	to	pursue	trade	agreements	of	our	own,	let
them	remind	themselves	of	the	full	horror	of	civil	war	and	the	thousands	(among	them	British	soldiers	and	civilians)
who	were	killed,	maimed	or	murdered	during	the	Troubles.
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Traffic	in	goods	apart,	there	is	also	cross-border	trade	in	services	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.	There	the	Irish
argument	does	not	apply.	But	at	this	point,	Brexiters	might	remember	the	old	saying	‘a	bird	in	the	hand	is	worth	two	in
the	bush’.	In	this	case,	the	bird	in	the	hand	is	a	large	fraction	of	the	taxation	that	HMG	gets	at	present	from	the	City	of
London	in	respect	of	trade	in	services.	What	else	is	to	be	made	of	the	referendum	result?	It	does	not	authorize	the
dissolution	of	the	United	Kingdom.	(So	far,	the	Westminster	government	has	scarcely	consulted	at	all	with	the	other
three.)	It	does	not	authorize	the	Home	Office	to	pursue	policies	which	reek	of	shameless	ingratitude	for	the
indispensable	contribution	that	foreign	nationals	make	to	life	in	the	UK.	Nor	yet	can	the	referendum	result	authorize
the	pauperization,	however	unintended,	of	the	people	whom	Theresa	May	would	have	now	to	describe	as	only	just
managing	—	or	not	even	that.
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In	so	far	as	Nicola	Sturgeon’s	proposal	respects	constraints	such	as	these	and	minimises	damage	to	the	economy,	it
has	a	strong	claim	to	be	the	best	mediation	there	can	be	between	the	interests	of	the	48%	and	the	interests	of	the
52%	who	prevailed	in	the	referendum.
But	why	should	there	be	any	mediation	at	all?	Was	not	the	referendum	a	perfect	realization	of	direct	democracy?	Is
not	direct	democracy	the	purest	embodiment	of	democracy	itself?	Cannot	direct	democracy	command	our	simple
departure	from	EU	and	all	its	several	dependencies	—	whether	with	or	without	further	consultation	with	the	EU?
For	direct	democracy	people	seem	to	think	they	should	look	first	to	5th-4th	century	Athens.	But	Athenian	democracy
arose	out	of	a	quite	distinctive	conception	of	shared	liberty	and	equality.	If	there	was	ever	a	prospect	of	anything
remotely	comparable	to	that	sort	of	solidarity	taking	hold	in	Britain,	it	exists	no	more.	Another	difference	is	that,	in	the
Athenian	assembly,	the	vote	was	taken	after	argument,	back	and	forth,	face	to	face,	in	front	of	all	citizens	who	chose
to	be	present,	whether	to	listen	or	to	speak.	Such	exchange	was	sometimes	impassioned,	but	not	as	such
inhospitable	to	compromise	or	change	of	mind.
If	we	are	to	understand	what	is	possible	where	we	now	are,	it	is	more	useful	to	explore	our	own	times	and	hark	back
for	a	moment	to	Churchillian	democracy	(democracy	as	the	‘worst	of	all	possible	forms	of	government	apart	from
those	which	have	been	tried	from	time	to	time’).	There	all	adult	citizens	have	one	vote	and	enjoy	equal	access	to	the
representative	of	their	interests	in	Parliament.	Under	this	system,	many	votes	are	ineffective	or	simply	wasted.	But
proportional	representation	promises	remedies	of	a	sort.	Others	can	be	set	in	train.	Impatient,	however,	with	such
tinkering	—	and	eager	to	prevent	politicians’	intruding	‘their	own	preferences’	into	properly	democratic	governance	(a
mistake	not	peculiar	to	remainers)	—	some	theorists	have	proposed	referendum	as	the	only	democratic	way	forward.
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What	justifies	this	shift?	When	we	search	for	the	argument,	perhaps	we	should	think	of	the	underlying	theory	as
moving	beyond	the	idea	that	citizens	matter	equally	and	have	an	equal	right	to	their	say	upon	matters	of	public	policy
—	that	does	not	take	us	very	far	beyond	Churchillian	democracy	—	to	the	further	and	different	idea	that	all	citizens
have	a	right	to	say	their	say	for	themselves,	and	the	further	right	for	that	say	of	theirs	to	count	for	no	less	than	any
other	citizen’s	say.	Such	is	the	argument	for	a	referendum.	One	side	wins,	and	then	we	do	what	they	vote	for.
If	this	is	the	way	the	argument	goes,	however,	and	the	present	situation	is	the	result,	then	it	is	hard	not	to	object	that
the	force	of	the	equality	principles	that	start	the	transition	just	described	is	not	yet	exhausted.	Suppose	some	winning
policy	is	conspicuously	lacking	in	equal	regard	for	the	equal	interests	and	the	equally	vital	needs	of	other	citizens,	the
losers.	Suppose	the	winning	policy	threatens	us	with	what	Tocqueville	called	the	tyranny	of	the	majority.
By	hypothesis,	the	losers	are	no	less	equal	citizens	than	the	winners.	The	same	conception	that	underpins	the	case
for	referendum	suggests	that	its	outcome	can	be	intolerable.	That	need	not	be	presented	as	a	contradiction.	What	it
shows	is	the	necessity	for	compromise	—	or	else	for	a	theory	of	referendum	that	excludes	referendum	where	such	a
result	may	be	its	outcome.	Such	an	exclusion	follows	from	the	conception	of	equality	that	the	argument	for
referendum	began	with.
As	things	now	are,	who	must	mediate?	Members	of	Parliament	must	mediate	—	in	defiance	where	necessary	of
party	machinery	and	all	the	other	forces	that	bring	ignominy	upon	parliamentary	democracy.	Once	they	look	for
compromise,	EEA	plus	Customs	Union	is	far	preferable	(I	venture	to	say)	over	the	expense,	delay,	bad	behaviour
and	other	complications	that	will	attend	the	holding	of	another	referendum.
By	way	of	conclusion	—	by	way	of	annex	to	Churchill	—	let	me	offer	words	from	Aristotle,	a	practised	observer	of
political	events	as	well	as	of	nature	and	a	philosopher	well	placed	by	his	position	in	time	to	survey	impartially	(he	was
not	an	Athenian)	  a	whole	century	and	a	half	of	democratic	endeavour:
“Many	things	that	are	held	to	be	democratic	destroy	democracies,	just	as	many	things	held	to	be
oligarchical	destroy	oligarchies…	It	is	possible	for	an	oligarchy	or	a	democracy	to	be	satisfactory	even	if	it
diverges	from	the	theoretic	ideal.	If	one	strains	either	of	them	further,	first	one	will	make	the	polity	worse,
and	then,	in	the	end,	one	will	make	it	not	a	polity	at	all.”
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	neither	those	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog	nor	of	the	LSE.
David	Wiggins	is	Wykeham	Professor	of	Logic	Emeritus,	University	of	Oxford.
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